Monday, October 13, 2014
Treat sedition suspects as guilty until proven innocent, Umno MP says
Friday, October 10, 2014
A nugget
Monday, May 19, 2014
Personality versus structure and process
Friday, April 26, 2013
Phantom voters in EC rolls
Thursday, September 15, 2011
Federalism in Malaysia
Going back to Elazar's description, we are reminded, from time to time, by various communities and groups in both Sarawak and Sabah that the central government has short-delivered its end of the contractual bargain.
- Appointment of judges
- Land
- Local Government
Monday, September 12, 2011
British Malaya: Balik ke pangkal jalan
Wednesday, August 10, 2011
UK Riots: Crowdcrime
And, I should also suggest that the police use paint guns - oil-based or permanent dye not water-soluble - to mark the culprits so that after the event, the police can conduct house-to-house searches. Or, conscientious parents and friends can report these "stigmatised" persons.
Worried about innocent bystanders being shot with paint? Don't be. I would not want to be present where a riot was happening. Would you? So, if you're in the wrong place at the wrong time your instinct would have been to run or walk away. If you have stayed as a busybody and got shot with paint, then, you've got some explaining to do. That's all.
Tuesday, July 12, 2011
Al-Fatihah YM Raja Aziz Addruse

Sunday, January 2, 2011
Constitution of the State of Selangor
Tuesday, November 24, 2009
GST bill: Where can the public give comments?
Najib is quoted as saying that, "This will allow the public to give their comments, engage them, and if we find it necessary to fine tune it, we'll do so".
He stressed that if the government decided to introduce the GST in Malaysia, it would do so "very gently".
"It's not going to be an abrupt introduction," Najib said, adding that if the GST materialised, the rate would not burden the poor or middle-class Malaysians.
"And, it would not lead to inflation," he added.
Firstly, by tabling a Bill, the legislative process has commenced. There's a First Reading, then, there's a Second Reading and, then, a formal Third Reading whereupon the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament. The speed of the legislative process is at the discretion of the coalition in power.
A sincere effort at allowing public input should involve putting up the draft Bill in a suitable website, perhaps by the Treasury where comments can be received in an orderly fashion.
Tabling a Bill is a fait accompli which is, by definition, "an accomplished, presumably irreversible deed or fact".
Secondly, all consumption taxes has an inflationary effect even if it is a once-off effect.
Thirdly, "not be(ing) abrupt" is a relative view of the Prime Minister. If by "not be(ing) abrupt" he means that there will be lots of publicity about the Bill (and, therefore, following the reasoning, there should not be any psychological shock), then, he may be correct. But, the moment the Bill becomes an Act of Parliament and, it is given the Royal Assent and, is given a Commencement Date, then the implementation will still inevitably be felt by the public and the Malaysian economy as an "abrupt" phenomenon.
The question, therefore, is why the draft Bill should be tabled in Parliament when it can easily be posted at Treasury's website where public opinion can be sought for a period of, say, 6 months?
Monday, November 9, 2009
MACC clears Eusoff and Lingam of wrongdoing in NZ trip
The MACC decision is another reminder to Malaysians that there is something very seriously wrong with the way in which Malaysia is being governed. It is as if nothing has changed since March 8, 2008. It's really "business as usual".
Something's got to give...
Saturday, June 27, 2009
The sultan's role in Perak
Dr Kevin YL Tan has taught constitutional law for over 20 years. He currently holds Adjunct Professorships at the Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore and the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies at the Nanyang Technological University. He holds a doctorate in law from Yale University. He is the author of Constitutional Law in Malaysia & Singapore (with Thio Li-ann); Introduction to Singapore’s Constitution and numerous articles on constitutional law in Singapore, Malaysia and the region.
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Sultan Azlan Shah's appointment of Datuk Dr Zambry bin Abdul Kadir as Perak’s Menteri Besar on 17 March precipitated a constitutional crisis that culminated in the case now before the courts. The facts of the case are by now, fairly well-known and merit only a brief recount.
Following nation-wide general elections in March 2008, the Pakatan Rakyat (PR) won 31 seats in the 59-member Legislative Assembly and Datuk Seri Mohammad Nizar bin Jamaludin was appointed Menteri Besar of Perak. The Barisan Nasional (BN) held the remaining 28 seats. In February 2009, three PR members -- DAP’s Hee Yit Foong, and PKR’s Jamaluddin Mohd Radzi and Mohd Osman Mohd Jailu -- announced their resignations from the legislative assembly, leaving each party in control of 28 seats each.
On 4 February, Nizar approached Sultan Azlan Shah to dissolve the assembly to "resolve the deadlock". The next day, the sultan met with 31 members of the assembly, and was satisfied that they supported Zambry as MB, and then informed Nizar that his request for dissolution of the state legislative assembly had been rejected. Among the 31 members present at this meeting were the three PR members who had earlier resigned. They had apparently withdrawn their resignations and transferred their support to Zambry. The sultan then informed Nizar that he no longer commanded the confidence of the state assembly and asked him to resign as MB. Zambry did not comply, and the sultan’s office issued a press statement declaring the office of MB vacant and that Zambry had been appointed the new MB since he commanded the confidence of the majority of state assembly members.
On 11 May 2009, the Kuala Lumpur High Court ruled that as there had been no vote of confidence on the floor of the state legislative assembly, Nizar remained the rightful MB of Perak. Zambry appealed against this decision and on 22 May, the Court of Appeal overturned the High Court decision and declared that Zambry had been rightfully appointed as MB.
At the time of writing, the Court of Appeal has yet to deliver the grounds for that decision. Even so, Nizar’s lawyers filed an application for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal decision on 19 June 2009. This application is scheduled for hearing on 9 to 10 July.
Issues raised by the High Court's decision
As the High Court’s decision is the only one available, this commentary relates to this judgment. The key issues in this case are whether Sultan Azlan Shah:
a. could dismiss the Executive Council when Nizar refused to tender the Council’s resignation after the Sultan refused to his request to dissolve the Legislative Assembly;
b. was constitutionally empowered to appoint Zambry the new MB when Nizar refused to tender the resignation of the Executive Council; and
c. had a discretion to determine if Nizar had lost the confidence of the majority of members of the Legislative Assembly in any other way than by a vote on the floor of the Assembly.
Ambit of Article XXVI(6)
The key to answering these questions is Article XXVI(6) of the Perak Constitution which provides:
If the Menteri Besar ceases to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly, then, unless at his request His Royal Highness dissolves the Legislative Assembly, he shall tender the resignation of the Executive Council.
The High Court Judge, Datuk Abdul Aziz J, adopted the "golden rule of interpretation" requiring a court to give the words of the Constitution a plain and ordinary reading if the words are unambiguous. Finding that Article XVI(6) of the Perak Constitution ‘contains no ambiguity whatsoever’, Abdul Aziz J held that the sultan had no power to dismiss Nizar; neither was he allowed to deem the office of Menteri Besar vacant when Nizar refused to resign. To do so, he added, would be to do ‘violence to the language’ of Article XVI(6).
The judge held that when Nizar requested the sultan to dissolve the state legislative assembly, he had not done so with "any reference to any provision in the Perak’s State Constitution" and in the absence of reference to any specific provision in the Constitution, Nizar was thus requesting the sultan to exercise his royal prerogative under Article XXXVI(2), which gave the sultan a general power to "prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly."
The textual argument
A textual reading of Article XVI(6) supports the High Court’s interpretation of this key provision. Article XVI comes under the heading "The Executive Council" and the relevant provision is the sixth of its eight sub-clauses. Though headings, sub-headings and marginal notes do not technically form part of the constitutional text, they help us understand the structure and organisation of the Constitution. On the face of it, Article XVI is clearly intended to deal specifically with matters relating to the Executive Council and not generalities.
A general request for the dissolution of the state legislative assembly and the sultan’s discretion thereof is governed by Article XXXVI(2) read with Article XVIII(2)(b). That means that the sultan has a general power to dissolve the state legislative assembly and may act in his discretion in withholding a request for dissolution. It is clear that such a general request for dissolution does not fall under Article XVI(6), which is to be deployed in a very specific instance.
This is immediately discernible when we read it sequentially: A MB who has already ceased to command the confidence of the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly must tender the resignation of the Executive Council, but only if the sultan exercises his discretion to refuse to dissolve the Legislative Assembly upon that MB’s request for dissolution.
Following from this reading, it is clear that the determination as to whether and when the MB has lost the confidence of the majority of the members of the state legislative assembly – as opposed to whether the MB was likely to command the confidence of the majority of LA members under Article XVI(2 – is a matter for the state legislative assembly itself. It is not an executive decision.
The argument from history
Does history support the High Court’s reading of Article XVI(6)? Back in 1956, various representations were made to the Reid Commission on the status and powers of the sultan and on his power to act. Back then, debates still raged over what necessary constitutional amendments needed to be made to make the Sultans "constitutional rulers" and whether the MB should hold office at the sultan’s pleasure.
What is clear from the resulting deliberations is that the Commission was determined to ensure that (a) the organisation of government in the states mirrored that of the Federation; and (b) the Malay Rulers should no longer preside over their state executive councils and involve themselves in executive decision-making save in very limited instances. These concerns led the Commission to set out the meaning of ‘constitutional ruler’ in paragraph 177 of their Report:
… a constitutional Ruler is a Ruler with limited powers, and the essential limitations are that the Ruler should be bound to accept and act on the advice of the Menteri Besar or Executive Council, and that the Menteri Besar or Executive Council should not hold office at the pleasure of the Ruler or be ultimately responsible to him but should be responsible to a parliamentary assembly and should cease to hold office on ceasing to have the confidence of that assembly. (emphasis added)
By the Commission’s reckoning, there was no intention to give the constitutional ruler a power to dismiss the MB or the Executive Council at will. Further support can be gleaned from a memorandum on ‘The State Constitutions’ prepared by Sir Ivor Jennings (CO 889/2 p. 156 dated 31 Aug 1956) – certainly the most important and influential member of the Commission – when he noted:
The Rulers will become constitutional monarchs and executive government must be placed under the control, direct or indirect, of the State Councils. It is assumed that the Ruler … would appoint a Menteri Besar … who would have, or hope to obtain, a majority in the State Council. … It is assumed that the Ruler would have power, on the advice of the Menteri Besar, to dissolve the State Council, but that, like the Queen, he need not accept the advice. The Ruler would not be empowered to dissolve without advice, though, of course, he could always appoint a new Menteri Besar who was likely so to advise because he had no majority.
Historical precedent is consonant with the High Court’s reading of Article XVI(6). The sultan was entitled to refuse a request to dissolve the state legislative assembly, be it a general request – for example when early elections are to be called or where the state legislative assembly is sharply divided over a key policy or the budget – or a specific request under Article XVI(6) after the MB has already lost the confidence of the majority of the state legislative assembly.
Dismissal of the Executive Council
Both the textual and historical arguments support the High Court’s reading of Article XVI(6). However, this does not resolve the question as to whether the sultan was empowered to (a) declare the office of the MB and Executive Council vacant; and (b) following from that declaration, proceed to appoint a new MB.
The Perak Constitution is not explicit on this point. What is clear is that the Executive Council is appointed by the sultan on the advice of the MB. Although Article XVI(7) states that members of the Executive Council hold their office at the sultan's pleasure, Article XVIII makes it clear that the sultan may not dismiss them at a whim, but only upon the advice of the MB. This reading is borne out by the Reid Commission Report that stated (at paragraph 181):
As the Executive Council is to be collectively responsible to the Legislative Assembly the appointment of its members must lie in the hands of the Mentri Besar and a new Mentri Besar must be free to appoint a new Executive Council in the same way as the Prime Minister appoints his Ministers. This result follows from our recommendation that members of the Executive Council should hold office at the pleasure of the Ruler because in appointing or terminating the appointment of a member of the Executive Council the Ruler must act on the advice of the Mentri Besar.
What happens if an MB, who has lost the confidence of the majority of the state legislative assembly, refuses to resign his position and that of the Executive Council after the sultan rejects that MB’s request for a dissolution of the state legislative assembly? This happened in Kelantan in 1977 when its MB, Datuk Mohamed Nasir refused to resign even though he had lost a vote of confidence motion in the Kelantan state legislative assembly, been sacked by his own party, and had his request for dissolution of the assembly refused by the Sultan of Kelantan. The impasse led to the declaration of a state of emergency by the Federal Government that lasted three months, after which the state legislative assembly was dissolved for fresh elections.
Alas, this single precedent is not particularly instructive. No legal solution was possible and the situation was resolved politically by the sultan dissolving the assembly and allowing fresh elections to be called. Perhaps, all rulers and governors should, as a matter of course, accede to requests by their respective MBs to dissolve the legislative assembly for fresh elections to be called unless the ruler has a premonition that a calamity might befall the state if he so acceded.
That way, new mandates are quickly determined and the business of government can proceed once a new leadership is established. Indeed, the Sultan of Perak supported this view of a ruler’s powers when he was Lord President. In his 1982 essay, ‘The Role of Constitutional Rulers’, he opined:
… under normal circumstances, it is taken for granted that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong would not withhold his consent to a request for dissolution of Parliament. His role under such a situation is purely formal.
This point was picked up by counsel for Nizar and cited with approval by the High Court.
The sultan has no explicit power to dismiss an MB under the Perak Constitution. Indeed, neither is the Yang di-Pertuan Agong empowered to dismiss a Prime Minister under the Federal Constitution. Originally, the Reid Commission had prepared a draft Article 36(2) which, among other things, gave the Yang di-Pertuan Besar power to remove the Prime Minister from office. However, as the High Court duly noted, the words were changed when the present Article 43(4) was promulgated. This provision is almost word-for-word the same as Article XVI(6) of the Perak Constitution save for the nomenclature used.
Conclusion
We return to the three questions posed at the start of this article. If, as the High Court rightly held, Nizar’s request for to dissolve the state legislative assembly was made under general provisions rather than under Article XVI(6), then the sultan had no power either to declare the office of MB vacant nor to dismiss the members of the Executive Council. And since the sultan had no power to declare the office of MB vacant, he was correspondingly prevented from exercising his discretion under Article XVI(2) to appoint Zambry as MB and to act on Zambry’s advice to appoint members to the Executive Council.
The third question posed – whether the sultan had a discretion to determine if Nizar had lost the confidence of the majority of state legislative assembly members – does not arise for consideration on the facts of this case. The question as to whether or not a show of confidence or support can be demonstrated in any way other than by a formal vote on the floor of the House is moot since the sultan is not being asked to exercise his discretion under Article XVI(2) to determine support or confidence for the purposes of appointing a new MB.
Even if the sultan was called upon to exercise his discretion on this matter, I would argue that the best way to determine confidence (or otherwise) in any individual as MB is to have a formal vote on the floor of the state legislative assembly. This is especially crucial in a political system that is not constrained by anti-hopping laws, and which allows assemblymen and assemblywomen to transfer loyalties at a drop of a hat. A formal vote will require formalities to be met, membership of political parties to be ascertained, and resignations or change of affiliations registered. Most importantly, it will provide for certainty.
One possible way to avoid future confusion over the sultan’s discretionary powers with respect to requests for a dissolution, might be to require the MB to state clearly in his request for dissolution, whether his doing so under the general provisions to which Article XXXVI(2) applied or because he has lost the confidence of the majority of the state assembly members under Article XVI(6). That way, there can be no issue of how the sultan is to deploy his discretion. This can be done as a matter of constitutional practice and will not require a constitutional amendment.
In the meantime, the problem remains. Two men claim to be the rightful MB of Perak and two groups claim to be members of the Executive Council. As scholars of constitutional law and keen observers of Malaysian politics, we anxiously await the Court of Appeal’s written judgment as we eagerly await the wisdom of the Federal Court to find a legal solution to an essentially political issue.
Wednesday, May 27, 2009
Telling your wife she's not pretty may soon be an offence
There is nothing humorous about this although, admittedly, I had many sly and curling remarks swimming in my mind. It's better to leave such thoughts in the privacy of the mind...until some scientist idiot invents the dreaded mind-reading device, that is....
By the way, I am obliged to point out that the legislation applies to both husband and wife and others as defined. An abusive wife saying that the husband is not handsome can get into trouble too!
The current definition of "domestic violence" is:
"domestic violence" means the commission of any of the following acts:
(a) wilfully or knowingly placing, or attempting to place, the victim in fear of physical injury;
(b) causing physical injury to the victim by such act which is known or ought to have been known would result in physical injury;
(c) compelling the victim by force or threat to engage in any conduct or act, sexual or otherwise, from which the victim has a right to abstain;
(d) confining or detaining the victim against the victim's will; or
(e) causing mischief or destruction or damage to property with intent to cause or knowing that it is likely to cause distress or annoyance to the victim,
by a person against-
(i) his or her spouse;
(ii) his or her former spouse;
(iii) a child;
(iv) an incapacitated adult; or
(v) any other member of the family: .
Star Online reported:
The plan is to amend the DVA for the inclusion of a clause on emotional violence against women.
Currently, they are only protected only against physical abuse, Women's Development Department director-general Datuk Dr Noorul Ainur Mohd Nur said.
She said on Wednesday that the aim for proposing the amendment was to safeguard women both physically and emotionally.
Dr Noorul said emotional violence was a form of abuse that would deeply scar a woman and lower their self-esteem, dignity and self-confidence.
“It could be a case where her husband tells his wife she is ugly or humiliates her until she feels emotionally pressured,” she told reporters at the end of a seminar on how to curb violence against women at Wisma Wanita here.
Friday, May 15, 2009
Arrest of 5 lawyers

These 5 lawyers were arrested while they were attempting to provide legal assistance to certain Malaysians who were arrested earlier for having participated in a candle-light vigil outside the Brickfields Police Station in Kuala Lumpur.
The right to legal representation is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia.
Their arrest, their 24-hour detention and the humiliation they received while in Police custody was the result of over-zealous action.
The 5 lawyers were not part of the candle-light vigil.
They went to the Brickfields Police Station because they received calls for help by the Malaysians who were arrested.
They were there to provide legal representation. That's all.
The principle of the Rule of Law requires that any person arrested by any lawful authority have a constititional right to legal representation.
Grabbing the 5 lawyers or, any lawyer for that matter, who are merely attempting to provide legal advice to persons arrested is just plain wrong, wrong, wrong.
Wednesday, April 1, 2009
Policing crowds: The power of 3
Section 27(5) of the Police Act 1967 (Act 344) states that:
Any assembly, meeting or procession-
(a) which takes place without a licence issued under subsection(2); or
(b) in which three or more persons taking part neglect or refuse to obey any order given under subsection (1) or subsection (3),
shall be deemed to be an unlawful assembly, and all persons attending, found at or taking part in such assembly, meeting or procession and, in the case of an assembly, meeting or procession for which no licence has been issued, all persons attending, found at or taking part or concerned in convening, collecting or directing such assembly, meeting or procession, shall be guilty of an offence.
That is an interesting threshold.
In Malaysia, THREE is not merely a crowd but, potentially, an unlawful assembly, meeting or (if the THREE is in motion i.e. walking, strolling, jogging, or running) procession.
Be that as it may, there is an article in the Economist that reports about psychological studies of crowd behaviour that points to a finding that crowds are not necessarily negative or prone to violence as is feared by many law enforcement authorities not the least of which is the Royal Malaysian Police:
Crowds have a bad press. They have been blamed for antisocial behaviour through mechanisms that include peer pressure, mass hysteria and the diffusion of responsibility—the idea that “someone else will do something, so I don’t have to”. But Dr Levine thinks that crowds can also diffuse potentially violent situations and that crime would be much higher if it were not for crowds. As he told a symposium called “Understanding Violence”, which was organised by the Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne in Switzerland earlier this month, he has been using CCTV data to examine the bystander effect, an alleged phenomenon whereby people who would help a stranger in distress if they were alone, fail to do so in the presence of others. His conclusion is that it ain’t so. In fact, he thinks, having a crowd around often makes things better.
......
His first observation was that bystanders frequently intervene in incipient fights. The number of escalating gestures did not rise significantly as the size of the group increased, contrary to what the bystander effect would predict. Instead, it was the number of de-escalating gestures that grew. A bigger crowd, in other words, was more likely to suppress a fight.
Some incidents did end in violence, of course. To try to work out why, Dr Levine and his colleagues constructed probability trees to help them calculate the likelihood that a violent incident such as a punch being thrown would occur with each successive intervention by a bystander. Using these trees, they were generally able to identify a flashpoint at which the crowd determined which way the fight would go.
Judging the fight to begin with the aggressor’s first pointing gesture towards his target, the researchers found that the first intervention usually involved a bystander trying to calm the protagonist down. Next, another would advise the target not to respond. If a third intervention reinforced crowd solidarity, sending the same peaceful message, then a violent outcome became unlikely. But if it did not—if the third bystander vocally took sides, say—then violence was much more likely.
I hope that our law enforcement bodies apply some resources to better understand these studies so that the perception of crowds is deeper and more holistic.
Crowds do not necessarily become mobs. There is a difference.
All things said and, done, I'm still interested in getting to the bottom of the number "3". Is it, intriguingly, the legislative draftsman's sly, dark humour to give the idiom "Three's a crowd" statutory effect in Malaysia?
Wouldn't that be a deliciously perverse use of an English idiom?
Thursday, February 19, 2009
First, Fire All the Lawyers
Writing in the American Lawyer, Aric Press surveys the economic landscape for big law firms, and finds no good news to report:
If present trends continue in the big firm market, we are heading toward–you pick the cliché–a paradigm-shifting, blood-in-the-suites, terror-on-the-campus hiring and retention crisis. The “economic reset” that General Electric’s Jeffrey Immelt has tagged seems likely to force changes in the way firms recruit, pay, and/or retain their lawyers. The market for labor has changed and, for now at least, there’s no normal to which it can return.
Press details a number of current market facts, then goes on to list five changes to watch for in the coming months:
Lower starting salaries: Bumping starting salaries up to $160,000 in major money centers arguably made sense when profits were booming and firms feared that they were losing their best talent to the hedge funds of Greenwich. Those days are over and yet the 160K bogie remains as inviolate as though it were handed down at Sinai. If the market–and not weird lemming-style management–drove the salaries up, then presumably the market should drive them down. How far? Back to $130,000, where they lodged at the peak of the tech boom? Back to $100,000, which one managing partner refers to as a “life-boat offer”–if you take it, we guarantee not to throw you over the side for several years?
Wage cuts: Several firms have announced wage freezes: no automatic raises for serving another year. This is not particularly novel among clients but it has caused a stir in law firms. It saves some money, but law firm managers admit perhaps not as much as they will need to weather the downtown.
Delayed and staggered starts: [L]ook for firms to behave as their clients do, delaying starts of new employees until there is some demand for their services. And look for them to behave unlike their clients-offering stipends for extended vacations, pro bono service and advanced course work, anything to build loyalty-and keep them out of the office.
Sharply reduced summer classes: It’s just your mother’s rule applied to hiring: don’t put more on your plate than you need. A class of ten, say, handpicked from Stanford, NYU, Harvard, Georgetown, UCLA, Emory, Northwestern, Columbia, Michigan and Fordham, is likely to maintain the partners self-esteem without jeopardizing the firm’s economics in September 2011.
More layoffs: Next time it will be partners.Friday, January 9, 2009
etheorist: The zeroth point of economics
Sunday, November 16, 2008
A-G's omission to act questioned
_____________________
THE recent arrests of Teresa Kok, Sin Chew journalist Tan Hoon Cheng and well-known blogger Raja Petra Kamaruddin under the Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) caused concern that the government could so readily use the draconian law of preventive detention without trial to silence criticisms made against it.
On that basis, the arrest of the journalist was clearly an abuse by the police of their power under the ISA.
Since he is the Minister responsible for the police, the Home Minister is answerable for the wrongdoing of the police.
Kok, too, was released a few days after being detained without any plausible reason being given for her arrest. Raja Petra was ordered to be released by the court on Nov 7.
After the initial arrest under section 73(1) of the ISA, the Minister had subsequently made an order under section 8 of the act for him to be detained for two years. This order has now been declared unconstitutional and ultra vires by the court.
The question that needs to be asked is how it is that such powers are now being exercised with what appears to be scant regard for the fundamental rights, liberties and freedoms guaranteed under the Federal Constitution.
Should those conferred with such drastic powers not be advised as to the limits of their power and of their responsibility in the exercise of such powers? The person who is constitutionally entrusted with the function of advising the government and ministers of government on such matters is the Attorney-General. It is his constitutional duty to uphold the Federal Constitution and citizens’ fundamental liberties as guaranteed under Part II of the Federal Constitution.
It would have been the Attorney-General’s duty to advise the police and the Home Minister that the reasons they gave for arresting Tan and Kok under the ISA did not warrant the exercise of power under section 73(1) of the ISA.
He should also have advised the police and the Minister that there are specific prerequisites which need to be satisfied before the power of arrest and detention under the act can be lawfully invoked.
Read more here.