If you need a context to what I have written go here.
Tuesday, February 11, 2014
1MDB to land power project?
If you need a context to what I have written go here.
Tuesday, January 11, 2011
Time for IPPs to help the rakyat
It is often highlighted that these IPPs have collected billions of ringgit from lopsided power purchase agreements (PPAs) that put them in very minimal or an almost zero-risk environment.
The IPPs are YTL Power Generation Sdn Bhd, Genting Sanyen Power Sdn Bhd, Segari Energy Ventures Sdn Bhd, Powertek Bhd and Port Dickson Power Sdn Bhd. They are controlled by some of the country's richest families and individuals.
Friday, November 28, 2008
TNB paid RM43 Billion to IPPs
Wednesday, November 12, 2008
IPPs, Tenaga and Telekom
In fact, the main beneficiary of the 24% electricity tariff hike is Petronas, which more than doubled its gas price to Tenaga – to RM14.31/mmBTU, from RM6.50/mmBTU! Besides higher gas prices, Tenaga is also incurring higher coal prices, which at about US$95 today are still 25% higher than the average US$76/MT Tenaga incurred in its last financial year ended Aug 08. The pain will be made even worse by the depreciating ringgit.
Some numbers will illustrate this. That 24% tariff hike will add about RM5.5bn p.a. to Tenaga’s revenue. Of that, RM5.3bn goes to third parties, leaving Tenaga with just a measly RM200m of the RM5.5bn additional revenue:
RM1.0bn to cover higher coal prices:
RM135m for capacity payments to new IPP Jimah.
In fact, by next year, Tenaga will be in a negative situation again because capacity payments to Jimah will rise to RM 700m! If you want lower power tariffs, the appropriate targets are the IPPs which have earned exorbitant returns and Petronas, not Tenaga.
And yet Telekom gets a RM2.4bn handout of taxpayers’ money to do high-speed broadband while Tenaga is pilloried for high power tariffs which are not its fault in the first place.
If there’s one GLC to target for inefficiency, it’s Telekom. Why do we still have to pay Telekom RM25/month for fixed line ‘rental’? My housing estate was built in the 1970s. Surely after over 30 years Telekom has already more than covered its capital cost of laying down the telephone lines. And then there are the huge issues with Streamyx ….
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
Ani Arope, TNB and IPPs
The interview sheds some light on the circumstances under which the Independent Power Producers (IPPs) came into being. That is the historical context.
This post is pertinent because the Malaysian government is in the midst of preparing a National Energy Policy. The Malaysian public deserves to be involved. When the first draft of the Policy is ready, it should be made public for input. But, will the government do it? Or, will they just ram-rod it through as "business as usual"?
As for the politico-economic context of IPPs, like all important things in Malaysia, I had to dig up an excellent paper written by Jeff Rector of Stanford University, California entitled, The IPP Investment Experience in Malaysia. I implore you to read this paper if you wish to have a good idea of what the IPP issue is all about.
But, to lend you a quickie on the paper, I have extracted below the summation pages of Rector's paper:
ANALYSIS OF THE MALAYSIAN IPP EXPERIENCE
A. Was the IPP Program a Success or a Failure?
One analyst said, “The first batch of IPPs, namely YTL Power, Malakoff, Genting Sanyen, Powertek and PD Power Bhd derived between eighteen and twenty-five percent internal rate of return (IRR). Other observers said that the first five IPPs had been “‘laughing all the way to the bank’ as they had been enjoying favourable terms ‘not found anywhere else in the world.’”
Additionally, all of the original players are still in the business and willingly entering new contracts at rates lower than agreed in the first round of investment. As to the second wave of investment, an analyst said that “the market expectation is that any new PPAs signed with [Tenaga] will give an IRR of only about twelve per cent.”
That Tenaga was willing to threaten unilateral revision of the contracts and withhold payment for two months may have hung a cloud over the sector, but during the crisis period, IPPs were perceived by at least one analyst to be one of the best sectors in which to invest. Publicly listed IPPs have provided a better return than both the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange index and Tenaga during the relevant period. Separately, it seems that bondholders and lenders to the project companies were paid according to originally contracted schedules without difficulty.
B. Why did the Contracts Hold?
It is notable that the PPAs were not altered during the economic crisis—a period when there must have been tremendous pressure on Tenaga to unilaterally change the terms of its expensive obligations to the IPPs. The national off-taker was forced to manage a debt crisis while it was hemorrhaging due to the expensive IPP contracts coupled with low power demand.
Nor were they altered in 2001 as some reports have indicated.
This conclusion would be hardly a surprise to those close to the deals but others have somehow been given a different impression. In 1998, IPPs constituted about thirty-five percent of Tenaga’s capacity (and even more of production) and were more expensive than Tenaga’s own generating capacity. Power demand was low and Tenaga was contractually bound to purchase power that it could not sell. The drop in electricity demand brought on by the Asian financial crisis exacerbated these problems, but the fact that fuel for the IPPs was produced domestically and the projects were financed exclusively in local currency significantly mitigated the stress of the crisis.
In light of the breaches of contract and forcible renegotiations seen in the IPP sectors of Pakistan and Indonesia, we might not have been surprised if in a country like Malaysia, with a weak rule of law, the state-controlled power company under serious duress decided to change the rules on investors after the investment was in place and the balance of leverage shifted. But this did not happen.
How was it that the IPPs could withstand Tenaga’s pressure to renegotiate in a time of national crisis? Was it because of the strength of their legal protections, or was it something else?
We offer the following hypothesis, which has two distinct parts.
First, the outcome of the 1998 renegotiation attempt was not the result of a two-party negotiation. Nor was it influenced by the expected value of the legal claims that either party may have brought. While the public position of the government at the time was that the dispute was not a government affair and that it should be resolved by Tenaga and the IPPs themselves, behind the scenes, the exact opposite was true. The outcome of the 1998 renegotiation attempt was determined and orchestrated by one actor, the Malaysian government.
Second, we identify a handful of considerations that might have influenced the government’s decision not to allow a renegotiation of the PPAs. The Malaysian government was the final decision maker and orchestrator of an agreement not to re-open the PPAs. Because the government had connections or control over each major stakeholder, there was no need to resort to the courts. It may very well be that because the courts were not believed to be reliable, an organizational structure that was held together with personal and ownership relationships was deliberately chosen so as to have a mechanism for commitment enforcement and dispute resolution without the courts.
In the aftermath of the crisis, the Malaysian government was involved in each of the key stakeholders in the IPP sector:
1. The government was a controlling shareholder in Tenaga. It appointed the Tenaga board and had final authority over any significant corporate decisions.
2. The government was an indirect shareholder in the IPPs. The government's super majority shareholdership in Tenaga flowed through Tenaga’s ten to twenty percent stake in all but one of the IPPs at the time of renegotiation.
3. The principle lenders to the IPPs were state-controlled. Most of the banks lending to theprojects were state banks. The state pension fund was by far the largest bondholder lending funds to the IPPs. In some cases it was the only bondholder. Needless to say, the government had influence and control over the decisions of state controlled banks and the state pension fund.
4. Finally, the promoters and principal investors in the IPPs reportedly had close personal ties to the prime minister and his close associates. The government was also the regulator of the IPPs and therefore capable of imposing future costs on the IPPs.
Given these extensive relationships, the fallout from the crisis for the IPPs in Malaysia was constrained by a number of factors. These include, concern over the reputation effects of instigating a dispute in the IPP sector, particularly given the troubles that were facing foreign investment throughout Asia at the time, and Malaysia’s successful incorporation of FDI in its own manufacturing sector as a driver of economic growth. Because of the broad reliance on domestic capital markets to finance the IPPs in Malaysia, decisions regarding the IPP sector here affected a distinct constituency than in many other IPP sectors. At the time, foreign equity investment in Malaysia was broadly spread in the power sector—including substantial investment in both IPP sponsors (e.g. National Power’s 15% stake in Malakoff), and in Tenaga itself.
Policy decisions on this front were made in an environment characterized by two factors unique to Malaysia.
First, Tenaga’s obligations (and the project companies’ financial structure) were comparatively less vulnerable to currency risk, due to reliance on local capital and fuel inputs.
Second, the network of relationships that connected equity holders and sponsors to debt holders and other lenders to government policy makers (and to Tenaga itself) likely opened avenues of communication and accommodation that were not available elsewhere in the IPP universe. IPP arrangements in Malaysia thus faced less pressure than in other countries that faced macroeconomic troubles, and were manageable through a range of relationships that also were not common in other countries.
Electricity tariffs: Feeling tricked
For the record, in the Star Online report of Thursday, June 5, the Prime Minister had announced that the electricity tariffs will rise due to, the restructuring of the fuel subsidies and the increase in coal prices, the Government had approved the new electricity tariff structure to allow Tenaga Nasional to absorb the cost for both commodities.
Recently, we are told that, Electricity tariffs will not be cut despite the massive drop in global crude oil prices.
Energy, Water and Communications Minister Datuk Shaziman Mansor said that oil did not directly affect the cost of electricity generation which was mainly sourced from gas and coal.
"We must bear in mind that 60% of electricity produced in this country is generated from gas and another 30% from coal. We cannot expect a reduction in electricity tariffs as there is no direct link here," he said at his Hari Raya open house. This was reported in the Star Online Saturday, October 25.
Read Aliran's analysis of this issue on Friday, June 6 and Saturday, August 5.The BN government created the IPP monster (click here to see how many posts I have made on IPPs). It has an opaque structure cost structure such that the Power Purchase Agreements is not open to public scrutiny.
No matter how anyone sympathises with UMNO or any BN component parties, it is issues like this that is contributing to the downfall of UMNO and BN.
They can spin this issue all they like. But, come every month, when Malaysians examine their TNB electricity bill, they will be reminded that they are being treated with contempt by UMNO and BN.
UMNO party elections can come and go. MCA elections, MIC elections and, even, Gerakan elections can capture the headlines for as long as they can. But, unless there is proper economic management of issues like the cost of electricity, the rakyat is reminded every month that if Pakatan Rakyat can offer better economic management, then come the next general elections, their sentiments will be even more clearly expressed than on March 8, 2008.
Saturday, October 11, 2008
Un-bondage
For this piece, I want to wear the hat of Lu Xun's fictional Chinese village idiot, Ah Q.You may recall that when the Ministry of Finance announced that they were considering a windfall tax on the Independent Power Producers (IPP) there was hue and cry. The IPP association, Janabebas decried the proposed move. Nasir Razak of CIMB lobbied hard against it.
But the damage was done. In the first half of 2008, a total of RM125 billion worth of foreign funds were withdrawn from Malaysian shores. In the first half 2008 outflow exceeded the total outflows of RM92.3 billion for the whole of 2007.
Four reasons were offered for the outflow. First, there was political uncertainty. Second, they blamed inflation which rose to a 26-year high of 8.5% in July following the infamous fuel price hike. Then they blamed the proposed windfall tax on the IPPs. Finally, they blamed the 4.6% fiscal deficit that was tabled in Parliament last month.
We saw the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) sold down, with drastic changes in foreign shareholdings, while prices of bonds begin depreciating sharply.
In that time Bank Negara Malaysia was panned for failing to raise OPR rates to protect the Ringgit. In response, investors began discounting the value of the inflated Ringgit and immediately sold down the currency.
Remember all that?
The economic management of Malaysia was roundly criticised.
Fastforward
Today, in the wake of the economic turmoil in all major economies, a turmoil that has not shown signs of abating yet, we read about how our Malaysian economy is relatively unscathed by the economic turmoil. Wonderful isn't it?
History is replete with happy accidents. For example, the microwave technology used in our microwave ovens was discovered when a scientist that was part of the atomic bomb team in Los Alamos found that a bar of chocolate left in his lab coat had melted in proximity to radiation.
Likewise, by making all the wrong moves the Malaysian Ministry of Finance can now claim to have pre-empted the economic turmoil by inducing a minor economic downturn in Malaysia's capital market.
Un-bondage
By these wrong moves Malaysia was inadvertently unshackled from bondage to foreign hot money.
This is the classic Ah Q mindset. Truly, wonderful.
Building more fortifications
Any gambling person will tell you that you should not challenge the odds. Since the odds of another happy accident is pretty remote at this time, Malaysians should renew the call upon the new Minister of Finance and his existing No.2, to get cracking...NOW.
I had blogged earlier about serious reconsideration of pegging the Ringgit. I want to add a few more points for consideration.
First, the MOF I and II needs to look at the risk of contagion affecting FDIs in Malaysia as their parents, especially in the U.S., are confronting turmoil. Giants like General Motors are teetering from share price collapse in Wall Street. For Malaysia, plant closures cause unemployment.
Second, traditional pump-priming solutions may not be so easy at a time when sovereign debt fundraising may find few takers in a credit-crunch environment. So, MOF I and II needs to review the 4.6% fiscal deficit.
Third, fundamentally sound companies in the plantation sector are being battered by CPO futures prices that have breached RM2,000-00 per metric tonne. This sector may not be the star contributor to Malaysia's economy as previously thought.
Fourth, the local automotive sector is also facing falling demand for new cars.
Fifth, there is a serious possibility of a revival of the spectre of real property overhang as demand softens.
Finally, global oil prices have softened. It has touched USD83-00 per barrel. While Malaysian consumers can cheer the prospect of reductions in petrol prices, Malaysia's national wealth from oil revenues will decline commensurately. Petronas may not necessarily be the panacea to cushion the sharp edge of economic turmoil. To be perfectly objective, we must recall that Petronas bailed out Dr M. Otherwise Dr M may not have been so heroic.
This is only a shortlist. But all Malaysians can see that MOF I and II needs to do a LOT of work if they are to earn the everlasting gratitude of Malaysians in the aftermath of the impending economic challenges to Malaysia.
Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Nationalisation is the new sexy word
Nationalisation need not be the end of the story. The giants’ assets should be liquidated over time, or the entities broken up and privatised. The companies’ size and strange structure carry a big cost for American finance. Backed by cheap government funding, their bosses have speculated with the gusto of hedge-fund managers—and lost, time and again. The two Leviathans have squeezed private firms into the riskiest ends of the mortgage market, such as subprime lending. They have not brought sharply lower mortgage rates to America. Europe, where mortgage markets are fully private, is no worse-off. Read Fire the bazooka at The Economist.
Wednesday, August 27, 2008
Casino and NFO tax increases in Budget 2008
Malaysia's Budget 2008 is likely to impose a gaming tax hike. The Malaysian government needs to maintain the budget deficit at 2.3% of GDP. Malaysia's gaming industry comprising numbers forecast operators (NFO) that conduct online 4D and Lotto games will provide an additional source of financing to contain the budget deficit.
The recent imposition of windfall taxes on independent power producers (IPP) and oil palm plantation companies lend further credence to this view.
Tax risk on NFOs
The last revision for NFOs (from 7% to 8% of gross revenue) and casino (from 22%-25% to 25% flat of gross revenue) were 10 years ago. NFOs’ betting duty was standardised from 6%-12% to 6% of net revenue in 2003.
It is estimated that every 1% hike in gaming tax would add about RM100 million or 4% to the Malaysian government’s annual gaming-related revenues of RM2.6 billion which comprises less than 1% of the government’s total annual revenue.
Tax risk on casino operations
Casino operations are regarded as being relatively more resilient demand. The Malaysian casino's grind market - an industry term for retail-type gamblers, as opposed to high-rollers - constitute a significant 70% of Malaysian casino revenue.
Risk impact
The tax hike, if any, is unlikely to be substantial. Malaysian casino’s present gaming tax of 25% is already Asia’s second highest after Macau’s 39%. In contrast, Singapore is considering a 15% tax the for grind market and 5% for the high-roller segment.
A huge increase will erode Malaysian casino's competitiveness, especially in the thinner-margin high-roller segment, as it reduces flexibility in offering rebates and commission to boost casino patronage. Industry observers believe that there is a possibility of the Malaysian government introducing a two-tier gaming tax similar to Singapore's model.
Thursday, July 31, 2008
Malakoff, IPP and Privatisation: Learning from Fannie and Freddie
Friday, July 25, 2008
IPPs exempted from paying windfall profit levy with new agreement
Second Finance Minister Tan Sri Nor Mohamed Yakcop said in a statement that the new move was to encourage progress in the negotiations.
A committee comprising the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department, Finance Ministry and the Energy, Water and Communications Ministry would be set up to oversee and arbitrate the negotiations between the IPPs and Tenaga Nasional Berhad. Read the full report here.
Tuesday, July 8, 2008
IPP association urges govt to reconsider windfall levy
Meanwhile, the TheEdgeDaily reported that the Association of IPPs in Malaysia has urged the BN federal government to review and defer the imposition of the windfall profit levy on them, pending a more exhaustive economic impact assessment on its far reaching implications for the country as well as the independent power producers (IPPs).-
The IPP Association said it had consulted key financial institutions and experts and the feedback on the move to impose the Windfall Profit Levy (Electricity) Order 2008 would not only be detrimental to the IPPs, but to the overall economy and investor confidence. A windfall tax of 30% is to be charged on any excess return of assets over the threshold of 9%.
It said in 2006, the value of ringgit bonds and notes issued by the IPP sector was estimated to be in the region of RM20 billion, making the sector one of the largest issuers of Islamic bonds in the country.
It added that the market's acceptance and confidence in the bonds were premised on a clear understanding of the IPPs' operating environment, business models and contractual obligations. The IPP Association cautioned that any changes to those fundamentals could precipitate a default in bond payments and this in turn would have an adverse impact and "multiplier effects" on the country's financial markets.
The IPP Association said bonds issued by the IPPs would immediately face downgrading; IPP bond investors, including many domestic institutional investors, may in turn be forced to liquidate their bond holdings; and the resulting loss of investor confidence in the capital market would cause further downgrading of other securities precipitating a major sell-off.
MALAYSIAKINI: MPs query 'extreme profits' for IPPs
UPDATE (July 20, 2008): There is an excellent study on the M'sian IPP experience done in 2005 by Jeff Rector at Stanford University.The study is very complete and it is nuanced by including the Great Blackout of 1992 that created the impetus for the privatisation of electricity supply and, some political subtext to the IPP saga. Read The IPP Investment Experience in Malaysia.In his reply to Lim Guan Eng (DAP-Bagan), Deputy Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department SK Devamany revealed that for the financial year 2006/2007, IPPs Segari Energy Ventures Sdn Bhd and YTL Power Generation Sdn Bhd pulled in pre-tax profits of RM614.883 billion and RM252.033 billion respectively.
TNB Janamanjung Sdn Bhd and Tanjung Bin Power Sdn Bhd, meanwhile, earned pre-tax profits of RM860.498 billion and RM332.892 billion, respectively. Among the other big earning IPPs, Powertek Bhd and Genting Sanyen Power Sdn Bhd earned RM372.6 billion and RM312.275, respectively.
Devamany also disclosed that 10 IPPs, from May 1997 to March 2008, received RM35.695 billion in gas subsidies from national petroleum firm Petronas. "
IPPs are protected by the unfair Power Purchase Agreements ("PPA") which forces Tenaga Nasional to purchase all power generated by the IPPs. We are told that Petronas is also subsidising the fuel consumed by these IPPs. Consumers are being forced to absorb the increased costs via higher electricity tariffs. This is classic rent-seeking behaviour.
-
The government must do a work-out for Tenaga to acquire the IPPs. Tenaga can do a massive bond-raising exercise to acquire the IPPs with the government to stand as a sovereign guarantor. The consolidated cashflow from the IPPs and Tenaga's own operations combined with the sovereign guarantee should make these bonds attractive and be given a triple-A rating.
-
I know there are brickbats thrown at Tenaga. But it is still a better vehicle that can be audited as opposed to the opaque structure that currently exists. Furthermore, the PPAs are under the Official Secrets Act, apparently. That is a sham!
Friday, May 30, 2008
The Malaysian problem with privatisation of public goods
- Appointment of management and supervisory staff must be strictly on merits, not ethnicity.
- Salaries and wages must be competitively matched against equivalent positions in the private sector.
- Accountability and governance must be strictly monitored. Quarterly audits of finances and management processes by public accounting firms must be made mandatory. Their reports must be made public. No different from companies listed on Bursa Malaysia.
- Regular parliamentary scrutiny must also be made a feature.
- Obtain loans from other countries or international funds.
- Borrowing from private financial institutions or issuing debt instruments like bonds - These transactions create sovereign debts. The only issue is the mode of repayment and, interest and currency risk.
- Issue Treasury Bonds aka Malaysian Government Securities.
- Income tax.
- Sales and value-added tax.
- Lotteries.
- Public charities and donations.
- Roads, highways and bridges (yes, even the 2nd Penang Bridge!).
- Subsidise public transportation.
- Education scholarships.
- Sports development.
- Tourism-related projects.
- Micro-financing.
- Welfare schemes.